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The rapid decline in the welfare caseload remains a subject of keen interest to both policymakers
and researchers. In this paper, I use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
spanning the period from 1986 to 1999 to analyze how the economy, welfare reform, the Earned
Income Tax Credit, and other factors influenced welfare entries and exits, which in turn affect the
caseload. I find that the decline in the welfare caseload resulted from both increases in exits and
decreases in entries. Entries were most significantly affected by the economy, the decline in the real
value of welfare benefits, and the expansion of the EITC. The EITC had substantial effects on initial
entries onto welfare. Exits were most significantly affected by the economy and federal welfare
reform. Federal reform had its greatest effects on longer-term spells of the type generally
experienced by more disadvantaged recipients. Some out-of-sample predictions help explain the
otherwise puzzling observation that, despite substantial increases in the unemployment rate since
2000, caseloads have remained roughly constant.
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  The 1990s were a volatile time for the U.S. welfare system.  At the beginning of the 
decade, 4.1 million families received payments under the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) program.  By 1994, that number had risen to 5 million.  The caseload then 
plummeted to 2.6 million families in 1999.  Those families represented only 2.6 percent of the 
U.S. population, the smallest proportion receiving aid since 1967 (U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services 2002). 
  A substantial body of research has attempted to explain these changes.  Most studies have 
focused on two factors: the economy and welfare reform.  The welfare caseload began to rise as 
the economy entered a recession during 1990-91.  It fell as the economy expanded.  At the same 
time, many states began reforming their welfare programs under waivers from the AFDC 
program.  In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).  As a result, all states replaced AFDC with Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) between 1996 and 1998.  Compared to AFDC, in most 
states TANF imposes greater work requirements, greater sanctions for violating those 
requirements, and limits on the amount of time that recipients can receive aid. 
  Most studies agree that both welfare reform and the economy played important roles in 
reducing the caseload between 1994 and 1999.
1  A few studies point to other factors as well.  
MaCurdy, Mancuso, and O'Brien-Strain (2002) show that the decline in the real value of welfare 
benefits also contributed to the decline in caseloads.  Grogger (2003, forthcoming) reports that 
                                                 
1  See Blank 2000; CEA 1997, 1999; Grogger 2000; Huang, et al. 2000; Levine and Whitmore 1998; O'Neill and 
Hill 2001; Schoeni and Blank 2000; Wallace and Blank 1999.  Three studies are outliers.  Ziliak, et al. (2000) and 
Figlio and Ziliak (1999) estimate that welfare reform actually increased the caseload, albeit insignificantly.  Rector 
and Youseff (1999) estimate that the economy had no effect on caseloads.  See Blank (2002) and Grogger, Karoly, 
and Klerman (2002) for detailed reviews.   2 
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) played a particularly strong role in reducing the welfare 
participation rate.   
  In this study I estimate the effects of the economy and policy changes on welfare flows, 
that is, entries and exits, rather than the stock measures of welfare receipt that have been the 
focus of most previous analyses.  At first glance, one might expect stocks and flows to provide 
essentially equivalent information, since they are linked by a simple transition rule.  Yet there are 
reasons to think that flows might be more informative and of substantial interest in their own 
right.   
First, entry effects may weigh in at least some observers evaluation of the success of 
welfare reform.  Conservative proponents of reform explicitly sought to reduce welfare entries, 
particularly entries related to unwed childbearing (see R. Kent Weaver, 2000, ch. 6 ).  Such 
observers might question the success of welfare reform if the decline in the caseload resulted 
entirely from increased exits.   
Entry effects may also have implications for the provision of in-kind transfers.  
Historically, both Food Stamps and Medicaid were closely linked to welfare: families typically 
applied for welfare and Food Stamps at the same time, and Medicaid insurance for families was 
limited to families on welfare.  If families primarily learn about non-cash transfer programs 
when they first apply for welfare, then policy interventions that reduce welfare entry could also 
reduce take-up of such safety net services. 
  Furthermore, entry effects may affect one's interpretation of recent research on welfare 
reform.  Since welfare reform experiments are based on welfare participants, they reveal 
primarily how policy reforms affect welfare exits.
2  So-called "leaver" studies, which track 
families as they move off the welfare rolls, explicitly focus on the behavior of families exiting 
                                                 
2  See Grogger, Karoly, and Klerman (2002) for a comprehensive review of numerous reform experiments.   3 
welfare.  However, if recent policy changes have had important effects on welfare entries, then 
such studies provide only a partial portrayal of how those changes have affected life in the low 
end of the income distribution. 
  Finally, accounting for the link between stocks and flows reveals inertia in welfare 
caseloads.  Even though economic and policy changes may affect entries and exits 
contemporaneously, it takes time for those changes to fully manifest themselves in the welfare 
caseload.  As a general proposition, this point has been recognized by others (Klerman and 
Haider 2002).  Here I show that it helps to explain the otherwise puzzling observation that, 
despite large increases in unemployment between 2000 and 2002, the caseload has remained 
roughly constant. 
  Welfare entries and exits have been the focus of a handful of prior welfare reform studies.  
However, those studies have been based on relatively small samples.  This has sometimes 
resulted in precision problems, which have been further exacerbated by the fact that welfare 
transitions are relatively rare events.  In addition, most previous studies have involved sample 
periods that include only one or two years of post-reform data, which also has made it difficult to 
estimate the effects of reform with much precision. 
  As a result, previous estimates are quite mixed, and in many cases, they run contrary to 
expectations.  For example, Ribar's (2002) analysis of SIPP data from 1991 to 1995 yields a 
marginally significant estimate suggesting that waiver-based reforms actually decrease welfare 
exit (which would increase welfare use) while having no effect on entry.  Acs et al. (2002) use 
SIPP data covering the periods 1990-1992 and 1996-1998 to study the effects of several types of 
welfare reform policies.  They find that several types of waiver-based reforms increase exit, but 
generally find no effect on entry.  Gittleman (2001) studies a sample from the Panel Study of   4 
Income Dynamics (PSID) that extends through 1995.  He finds that waivers increase exits, but 
also finds that they increase entries.  Hofferth et al. (2000a, b), also analyzing the PSID, estimate 
the effects of several reforms, as did Acs, et al. (2002).  They find work requirements and 
sanctions to increase exits, although six of the seven reforms they consider have insignificant 
effects on entry.  Finally, using administrative data from five urban counties, Mueser et al. 
(2000) report that reform decreases entry and increases exit.  Although their findings are mostly 
consistent with expectations, there are questions about the extent to which their results are 
representative of the nation as a whole. 
  My analysis employs SIPP data spanning the period from 1986 through 1999.  These data 
alleviate some of the problems confronting earlier researchers.  My sample sizes are substantially 
larger than those of earlier analyses, which helps solve the precision problem, and generally 
results in estimates that are consistent with expectations.  The longer sample period has the 
advantage of allowing me to estimate the effect of TANF, rather than being restricted to the 
effect of waiver-based reform.  A final advantage of my analysis is its inclusion of the EITC, 
which proves to be empirically important. 
  In the next section of the paper, I discuss the data.  Section III discusses the analytical 
methods.  In section IV I present regression results.  In section V I use those results to 
decompose the decline in welfare participation rates into components attributable to changes in 
the economy, changes in policy, and other factors.  In Section VI I use the estimation results to 
make predict how recent changes in the economy should affect welfare participation rates.  
Section VII concludes.   5 
II. The Data 
  A. Background on the SIPP 
  The SIPP consists of a number of panels, each of which is a longitudinal probability 
sample of the U.S. population.  In this study I include data from the 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 
1991, 1992, 1993, and 1996 panels.
3  The duration of the panels varies between 24 months (the 
1988 panel) and 48 months (the 1996 panel).  Thus the sample period extends from 1986 through 
1999.   
The panels are divided into waves, or four-month intervals at which the core module 
questionnaire is administered.  The core module provides extensive information about the 
behavior of panel respondents, including their welfare use.  At each wave, the SIPP asks 
respondents about their welfare use in each of the previous four months.  Although these data 
could be used to construct monthly welfare-use records, they suffer from "seam bias," meaning 
that reported transitions are much more likely to occur between waves rather than within waves.
4  
For this reason, I only make use of data from month 4 of each wave. 
  An entry occurs in wave t if the respondent was not receiving aid at wave t-1 but received 
aid in month t.  An exit occurs if she received welfare in wave t-1 but not in wave t.  
Participation rates at wave t are calculated as the number of persons on aid at wave t divided by 
the number of persons in the sample.   
The sample is restricted to low-skill women, defined as women with a high-school 
diploma or less, who are between the ages of 15 and 54.  These women constitute the vast 
majority of all adult welfare recipients.  SIPP respondents are classified on the basis of their age 
                                                 
3  The 1989 panel was truncated after 12 months; there were no new panels between 1993 and 1996; and there have 
been no new panels since 1996. 
4  In fact, some of the within-wave transitions that exist are due to the SIPP's imputation procedures rather than 
changes in behavior (Westat 2001).   6 
and education in wave 1, so they remain in the sample even if they attain more education or turn 
55 during the panel period.
5 
  Figure 1 plots trends in welfare use, welfare entries, and welfare exits.  In each figure, the 
dots represent means by wave within panels.
6  Because many of the panels overlap, there are 
multiple data points for many time periods.  The solid line in each figure represents a lowess 
smooth of the raw wave-by-panel averages. 
  In panel A, I also plot population welfare participation rates based on administrative data 
published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2002).  Because the 
denominator for the administrative data is the U.S. population, whereas the denominator for the 
SIPP series consists only of low-skill women, one would expect the SIPP series to be higher.  
What Figure 1 shows is that, for most of the sample period, the general pattern in the SIPP tracks 
the administrative data quite well.  Welfare use was roughly constant in the late 1980s, rose 
sharply between 1990 and 1993-94, and fell sharply thereafter.  However, at the end of the 
sample period, welfare use fell faster in the SIPP than in the administrative data.  This may be 
due to under-reporting of welfare use, which increased during the 1990s (Bavier 1999). 
  Three points are apparent in the plot of entry rates in panel B.  First, entry rose from the 
mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, then fell in the late 1990s.  Thus changes in entry were responsible 
for part of the decline in welfare use.  Based on both a somewhat different SIPP sample and 
administrative data from California, Grogger, Haider, and Klerman (2003) estimate that the 
decline in entry may have accounted for about half of the decline in welfare use. 
                                                 
5  The sample also excludes women living in 19 small states.  Nine of those states are not separately identified in the 
SIPP, which precludes me from merging on state-level data.  Sample sizes in the other states were so small that, for 
at least one of the transition models below, there were no actual transitions.  With state dummies in the model, this 
caused the logit model to fail to converge. 
6  All SIPP-based estimates in this paper are based on weighted data.   7 
  It is also apparent that welfare entry is a rare event, even among low-skill women.  On 
average, less than 1 percent of such women begin a welfare spell in each wave.  Furthermore, 
entry is volatile.  The rarity and volatility of entry rates may help explain why previous estimates 
of the effects of welfare reform on welfare entry have been so mixed. 
  Exit rates are plotted in Panel C.  Until about 1993, exit rates were roughly constant at 
about 10 percent per wave.  By 1999, they had risen to almost 25 percent.   
  Underlying these exit and entry rates are the welfare spells and non-welfare spells, 
respectively, that are the basis for the analysis below.  The SIPP samples from the population of 
such spells in two distinct ways.  The distinction has important implications for the regression 
analysis to follow. 
  Implicitly, the SIPP employs both interval and point sampling of welfare spells.  Under 
interval sampling, the analyst fixes an observation period and samples spells that begin during 
that period.  Spells that begin during the panel period are essentially interval sampled.  For the 
remainder of the paper, I refer to these as "fresh" spells.  Under some fairly standard 
assumptions, such fresh spells are representative of the population distribution of spells (Cox 
1967; Frank 1978). 
  Under point sampling, the analyst samples from spells in progress at a point in time.  This 
is essentially how the SIPP samples spells that are in progress when the panel begins.  I refer to 
these as "ongoing" spells for the remainder of the paper.  These ongoing spells are representative 
of spells in progress as of month 1 of the panel, but they are not representative of the population 
distribution of spells.  They over-represent lengthy spells and longer-term recipients, who are 
generally more disadvantaged than the average recipient (Bane and Ellwood 1994).   8 
  These differences are apparent in Table 1, which provides summary characteristics of 
spells and recipients sampled under the two different mechanisms.  To compute the duration of 
ongoing spells, I use data on the date the spell began that is reported in the SIPP recipiency 
history module.
7  Column (1) of Panel A shows that the average ongoing welfare spell had been 
in progress for 62 months as of month 1 of the panel.  The median completed duration of these 
spells is 160 months, which is due to the high level of right-censoring among those spells.
8  The 
median completed duration for fresh spells is 12 months, as shown in column (2).  The average 
exit rate from the ongoing spells is only 0.07, compared to 0.189 from the fresh spells. 
  The Table also shows that welfare recipients differ in a number of important ways across 
the two types of spells.  Recipients experiencing ongoing spells are older, less likely to be 
married, less educated, have more children, and are more likely to be minority members than 
their counterparts experiencing fresh spells.  Other studies have also associated these traits with 
longer spells on aid (Bane and Ellwood 1983, 1994; O'Neill et al. 1987; Pavetti 1993). 
  The information in Panel A illustrates clearly that the spells and recipients sampled by the 
two different mechanisms are substantially different.  Given these differences, it would not be 
surprising if the two groups of recipients responded differently to policy interventions or changes 
in economic conditions.  To account for this possibility, I stratify the sample in the analysis that 
follows, estimating separate exit regressions from the fresh and ongoing welfare spells.  The 
fresh spells yield estimates relevant to the population distribution of spells, whereas the ongoing 
                                                 
7  Ongoing spells are spells in progress in month 1 of the panel for which the respondent provided a start date that 
preceded month 1.  Spells in progress in month 1 that were reported to start in month 1 or later are classified as fresh 
spells.  Preliminary life table analyses showed that exit rates for these spells did not differ significantly from fresh 
spells that began after the first wave. 
8  Non-censored ongoing spells had a mean month-1 duration of 55 months and a mean completed duration of 72 
months.     9 
spells provide insights into how the changes that occurred during the 1990s affected longer-term 
welfare recipients. 
  The non-welfare spells that underlie the entry analysis are also implicitly sampled by the 
same two mechanisms.  The ongoing non-welfare spells are primarily initial non-welfare spells, 
that is, they pertain to people who have never received welfare.  The fresh non-welfare spells 
begin when welfare spells end during the panel period, and thus are useful for studying re-entry. 
Given the discussion above, it would seem natural to explicitly distinguish the initial 
spells from other ongoing non-welfare spells.  However, the SIPP does not allow one to make 
such a distinction consistently throughout the sample period.  Prior to the 1996 panel, the 
recipiency history module asked all SIPP respondents whether they had received aid at any point 
prior to the beginning of the panel.  In the 1996 panel, those questions were posed only to 
recipients not receiving aid in month 1.  Thus in the 1996 panel, initial spells cannot be 
distinguished from other ongoing non-welfare spells.  A tabulation of the pre-1996 data shows 
that 95 percent of ongoing non-welfare spells are indeed initial spells.  As a result, I refer to the 
analysis of the ongoing non-welfare spells as the initial entry analysis below. 
Not surprisingly, Panel B of Table 1 shows that the non-welfare spells and potential 
recipients sampled according to the two different mechanisms are quite different.  Median 
completed durations could not be computed for either type of spell due to high rates of right-
censoring.  Beyond that, only 0.6 percent of low-skill women begin an initial spell each wave; in 
contrast, 11 percent of former recipients re-enter.  Those re-entering are younger, less likely to be 
married, less educated, have more children, and are more likely to be minority members than 
those at risk of initial entry.  As with the exit analysis, I stratify the non-welfare spells for the 
entry analysis below.   10  
B. Economic and Policy Variables 
I merge the welfare transition data described above to several variables intended to 
characterize the economic conditions and policy environment facing actual and potential welfare 
recipients.  Economic conditions are captured by two variables: the unemployment rate and the 
25th percentile weekly wage.  Both measures vary by state of residence and year.  
Unemployment data are published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2002).  The weekly wage 
measure is based on tabulations of the Outgoing Rotation Groups of the Current Population 
Survey from MacRae (2002). 
Annual means are presented in the first panel of Table 2.  Average unemployment rose 
quickly in the early 1990s and then fell gradually.  Low-skill wages fell about 6 percent between 
1990 and 1994, remained roughly constant through 1997, then returned to their 1990 level by 
1999. 
Welfare reform is represented by two dummy variables.  The first equals one in all 
months between the time that the recipient's state of residence implements a statewide welfare 
reform waiver and the time that it implements its TANF plan.  The second equals one in all 
months after it implements its TANF plan.  These data are from Council of Economic Advisers 
(1999).  The second panel of Table 2 shows that states began implementing state-wide waivers in 
1992.  By the time PRWORA was passed, 29 states had implemented some sort of state-wide 
waiver.  Twenty-four states implemented TANF during 1996; all but one of the rest put their 
TANF plans in place during 1997.
9 
These variables allow me to estimate the effects of reform as a whole, but they do not 
allow me to estimate the effects of specific reforms such as work requirements, sanctions, and 
time limits.  As valuable as such estimates might be, preliminary analyses revealed that it was 
                                                 
9  The District of Columbia is treated like a state both here and below.   11  
impossible to estimates the effects of specific reforms on transition rates with any precision, even 
with the sample sizes available in the SIPP.  As a result, I follow the lead of much of the prior 
literature on welfare reform, providing estimates of the effects of waivers and TANF as a bundle. 
The other welfare policy variable is the maximum benefit available to a family of three.  
The maximum payment varies dramatically across states, from $170 in Mississippi to $626 in 
California and $1,118 in Alaska (in 1999).  Panel C of Table 2 shows that the real value of 
average benefits fell by nearly 20 percent over the 1990s. 
The final policy variable in the models below reflects the generosity of the EITC.  The 
federal EITC is a refundable credit that can be characterized by its initial subsidy rate, its 
maximum credit (or equivalently, the income threshold below which the subsidy is available), 
the threshold at which the credit is phased out  as earnings increase, and the phase-out rate.
10  
Fifteen states have implemented EITC's of their own, which typically increase the subsidy rate 
(and maximum payment) by either a fixed amount or a proportion of the federal rate. 
Panel D of Table 2 presents mean subsidy rates and maximum benefits by year of the 
combined federal and state EITC's.
11  Two major changes occurred during the 1990s.  First, the 
program became more generous.  The credit rate for one-child families rose from 14.1 percent in 
1990 to 34.8 percent in 1999.  At the same time, the maximum credit rose from $1,196 to $2,314.  
Second, the program became relatively more generous for larger families.  Credit rates and 
maximum credits were essentially the same for all families in 1990.  In 1999, the credit rate was 
6.4 percentage points, or 18 percent, higher for families with multiple children than for families 
with a single child.  The maximum credit was $1500 higher.  In the models reported below, I use 
                                                 
10  See Hotz and Scholz (2001) for a useful summary of the program. 
11  The credit rate used in the regressions is the sum of the federal and refundable state credit rates.  Results based on 
measures that included non-refundable state credits were somewhat weaker, which may be the result of 
measurement error.  For workers with little tax liability, the nominal non-refundable credit rate may substantially 
overstate the actual credit rate facing the worker.   12  
the combined state and federal credit rate to characterize the generosity of the EITC.  Estimates 
based on the maximum credit were generally similar but in some cases were less significant. 
III. Estimation 
  Since the spells are measured discretely, it is natural to use a discrete-time hazard model 
for the regression analysis.  Since entries represent a transition from a non-welfare spell to a 
welfare spell, and exits represent a transition from a welfare spell to a non-welfare spell, I can 
write the transition hazard generically as: 
) 1 ( ] ) ; ( [
) 1   by wave   tioned not transi   had family  | spell   of   th wave in    ns  transitio family  ( ) (
st di st
i
d g X Z F
d d i P d h
ε θ δ γ + + + =
− =
 
 The  vector  Zst represents the economic and policy variables discussed above, including 
the unemployment rate, the 25th percentile wage, the waiver and TANF dummies, welfare 
benefits, and the EITC credit rate.  These variables vary only by state and year, with the 
exception of the EITC credit rate, which also varies by family size.  The vector Xid represents 
individual characteristics such as age, education, race, marital status, number of children, and the 
age distribution of children.  Most of these variables are time-varying. 
 The  term ) , ( θ d g  is the baseline hazard, reflecting how the conditional transition rate 
varies with the length of the spell.  For the exit and the re-entry models, the baseline hazard is 
specified flexibly via a series of dummy variables that capture durations of different intervals.  
The intervals reflect durations over which the hazard is roughly constant, a revealed by some 
preliminary analyses.
12  In the initial entry model, durations are collinear with age.
13  Thus age 
                                                 
12  For the fresh spells (both welfare and non-welfare), separate dummies are included for durations of 1 to 7 waves; 
the hazard is assumed to be constant thereafter.  For the ongoing welfare spells, separate dummies are included for 
durations of 1 to 3 waves; another is included for durations of 4 to 5 waves; the hazard is assumed to be constant 
thereafter. 
13  In principle, one could use information from the recipiency history modules from the pre-1996 to measure the 
duration since the last welfare spell for persons who had previously been on aid.  Since the information needed to   13  
was entered via a series of dummy variables to provide a flexible baseline hazard for this 
model.
14 
  The final term εst represents unobservable, state-specific factors that influence welfare 
transitions.  Examples may include unmeasured aspects of the state's economy or political 
sentiment toward welfare programs.   
  A problem arises if εst is correlated with the variables included in Zst.  Such correlation 
has been referred to as policy endogeneity in the welfare reform literature.  The problem is that, 
if the policies reflected in Zst are themselves influenced by unobservable determinants of welfare 
transition rates, then estimates based on the hazard model in equation (1) may be biased.   
  Although there is no way to control for arbitrary forms of policy endogeneity, state and 
year dummies may help reduce any potential bias.  This amounts to assuming that 
st t s st ν τ α ε + + = , where  s α  represents time-invariant characteristics of states that influence 
welfare transitions, and  t τ  represents time-varying unobservables that influence welfare 
transitions in a similar manner across the states.  The state-specific factors can be controlled for 
by including state dummies, or state fixed-effects, in the model, and the time-varying factors can 
be controlled for by including year dummies, or period effects.  If  st ν  is uncorrelated with Zst, 
then the estimates from equation (1) should be consistent. 
  A convenient choice for the function F(x) is the logistic.  With this choice, the transition 
models can be estimated with conventional logit regression software.  Estimates based on the 
logit model are reported in the next section. 
                                                                                                                                                             
construct this variable is unavailable in the 1996 panel, the resulting measure would incorporate measurement error 
that was correlated with many of the variables of interest. 
14  These controls include dummies for single years of age from 15 to 24 and five-year age-group dummies 
thereafter.   14  
IV. Estimation Results 
  A. Main Estimates 
Table 3 presents estimation results.  One feature of the logit model is that the estimated 
coefficients can be interpreted as approximate proportionate derivatives, where the 
approximation is better, the smaller the transition rate.  The approximation is likely to be best for 
the initial entry model, but for the sake of expositional convenience, I will refer to the estimates 
from all the models as if they represented proportionate changes in the transition rates associated 
with a one-unit change in the explanatory variables. 
  Results from the initial entry model are presented in column (1).  Both the economic 
variables are significant and perform as one might expect.  Higher unemployment increases 
initial entry.  This is consistent with estimates by Gittleman (2001) and Klawitter, Plotnick, and 
Edwards (2000), which appear to be the only two prior studies to have focused on initial entries.  
The estimate indicates that each percentage-point increase in the mean unemployment rate 
increases the rate of initial welfare entry by about 11 percent.  Based on the annual means in 
Panel A of Table 2, reductions in the unemployment rate should have reduced welfare entry from 
1992 to the end of the sample period in 1999. 
Higher wages also decrease entry, but their effect is not as great as that of the 
unemployment rate.  The coefficient indicates that each $10 increase in the real wage reduces 
entry by 6 percent.  Furthermore, the effects of wages and the unemployment rate worked in 
opposite directions over part of the sample period.  Based on the annual means in Table 2 and the 
wage coefficient in Table 3, wages should have increased initial entry by about 14 percent 
between 1990 and 1994, then decreased it by the same amount between 1997 and 1999.   15  
  The welfare reform coefficients are both negative, as one might expect, with the effect of 
TANF substantially larger than the effect of waiver-based reform.  The TANF coefficient is 
fairly sizeable, indicating that it reduced entry rates about 30 percent.  However, its standard 
error is also sizeable, which may stem from the collinearity between the TANF variable and the 
year dummies.  As a result, the estimate is at best only marginally significant, with a t-statistic of 
-1.5.   
  Welfare benefits, in contrast, have a significant positive effect on initial entry.  One 
would expect higher benefits to increase initial entry, if for no other reason than the higher 
eligibility thresholds that they imply.  Yet both Gittleman (2001) and Klawitter et al. (2000) 
report that higher benefits decrease initial entry, significantly so in the case of Klawitter, et al.  
The coefficient in column (1) of Table 3 indicates that a $100 increase in real benefits increases 
the initial entry rate by roughly 23 percent.  Thus the $89 decline shown in Table 2 would have 
reduced initial entry rates by about 20 percent between 1990 and 1999, all else equal. 
  The EITC coefficient is also significant.  Indeed the expansion of the 1990s appears to 
have had a strong effect on initial entry rates.  The coefficient indicates that each percentage-
point increase in the credit rate reduces initial entry by 3.2 percent.  Thus the increase in the 
mean credit rate for multiple-child families between 1993 and 1999 would have decreased initial 
entry by more than half.  With an effect of that magnitude, one might expect the EITC to explain 
a substantial portion of the decline in the welfare participation rate over the same period. 
  The remaining estimates in column (1) show how various demographic characteristics 
affect initial entry.  These effects largely accord with expectations.  Young children, the lack of a 
high school diploma, minority status, and the presence of three or more children raise the 
likelihood of initial entry.  Being married or childless greatly reduces the likelihood of initial   16  
entry.  This comes as no surprise; married couples have to satisfy more stringent eligibility 
conditions than single parents, and the only childless adults who can qualify for aid are women 
beyond their first trimester of pregnancy. 
  Results from the exit models appear in the next two columns.  For the most part, exits are 
less responsive than initial entries to both economic conditions and policy changes.  An 
exception is the effect of unemployment on exits from ongoing spells.  The estimate indicates 
that each percentage-point decline in the unemployment rate should have increased exits from 
ongoing spells by about 15 percent.  However, unemployment has no effect on fresh spells. 
Wages have no significant effect on spells of either type.   
  The waiver and TANF coefficients are all positive and the two TANF coefficients are 
larger than the respective waiver coefficients.  However, only the TANF coefficient in the 
ongoing spells model is significant.  That coefficient is substantial in magnitude, indicating that 
TANF increased exit rates by roughly 48 percent. 
  The maximum benefits coefficients are both negative, suggesting that higher benefits 
reduce exit rates.  However, both coefficients are insignificant.  This is a common finding in 
previous studies, including those based on pre-reform data.
15  The EITC coefficients are positive 
in both models, suggesting that higher credit rates increase exit.  Again, however, both 
coefficients are insignificant.  The demographic variables mostly have significant coefficients, 
and most of them accord with expectation. 
  The final column presents estimates from the re-entry model.  Of the variables that 
measure the economic and policy environment, only the EITC coefficient is significant, 
indicating that increases in the credit rate reduce re-entry.  As in the initial entry model, the 
                                                 
15  See Acs, et al (2001), Gittleman (2001), Harris (1993), and Pavetti (1993).  Hutchens (1981), O'Neill, et al. 
(1987) and Ribar (2002) report significant negative effects.   17  
welfare reform coefficients are fairly sizable though insignificant.  Re-entry seems much less 
responsive to economic conditions than initial entries, and less responsive than exits as well. 
  To summarize, initial entries are most significantly affected by economic conditions, 
benefit levels, and the EITC.  This suggests that the immediate economic opportunities facing 
potential entrants play an important role in determining whether they apply for welfare.  Exits are 
most significantly affected by the unemployment rate and TANF.  Indeed, the only significant 
effect of TANF is to increase exits from ongoing spells.  The estimated coefficient suggests that 
TANF induced longer-term recipients to leave the rolls in substantial numbers.  Re-entry seems 
to be completely unaffected by economic conditions and benefit levels.  The effects of reform on 
re-entry are roughly as large (in absolute value) as their effects on exit, but the coefficients are 
insignificant.  Only the EITC expansions significantly affect re-entry. 
  In this summary interpretation of the estimates, precision is an issue.  The TANF 
coefficients in the entry models are sizeable but insignificant.  The same is true of the EITC 
coefficients in the exit models.  It may be that both policies had substantial effects on both 
entries and exits.  However, even with the sample sizes available in the SIPP, there is insufficient 
precision to distinguish some potentially important effects from effects that are equal to zero. 
  B. Additional Estimates 
Table 4 presents estimates from specifications that include additional measures of 
economic conditions, including lagged unemployment and job growth.  The motivation for these 
specifications is that the unemployment rate and the low-skill wage measure might not 
adequately control for the state of the economy by themselves, and that adding additional 
measures might provide greater insight in to the role played by the economy in influencing   18  
entries and exits.  In Table 4, only the coefficients associated with the economic and policy 
variables are shown in order to save space.   
None of the lagged unemployment coefficients are significant.  In many previous studies 
of the welfare caseload, lagged unemployment often has stronger effects than current 
unemployment, and in the case of multiple lags, often the last lag is the only significant 
coefficient (CEA 1997, 1999; Figlio and Ziliak 1999; Ziliak, et al. 2001).  Klerman and Haider 
(2002) argue that such results are indicative of misspecified dynamics and predict that such 
patterns should not appear in models of welfare transitions.   
Whether that prediction is borne out by these data is a matter of interpretation.  In some 
cases, the lagged unemployment coefficients are slightly larger than the current coefficients; in 
others they are smaller.  Testing Klerman and Haider's prediction is hampered by the 
considerable collinearity between past and current unemployment, which is also the likely reason 
why the current unemployment rate is insignificant when the lag is included in the model. 
The job growth coefficients suggest that greater growth increases welfare entry and 
decreases welfare exit.  However, in all cases, the coefficients are insignificant. 
On the whole, these additional measures do not substantially improve the characterization 
of the economic conditions affecting welfare transitions.  Of all the measures considered, only 
current unemployment and low-skill wages significantly affect entry or exit.  Furthermore, 
except as noted above, including the additional measures in the regression models has little effect 
on the other parameter estimates. 
V. Decomposing the Effects of Economic and Policy Changes on the Decline in Welfare 
Participation 
 
  The coefficients in Table 3 provide quantitative estimates of the effects of economic and 
policy changes on welfare transition rates.  From these one can infer the qualitative effects of   19  
those changes on the welfare participation rate.  However, it would be valuable to provide 
quantitative information about the effects of recent changes on welfare participation.  Although 
there are in principle a number of ways one could do this, a common practice in the welfare 
reform literature has been to decompose the decline in the welfare participation rate that took 
place during the 1990s into components attributable to the expanding economy, welfare reform, 
and other factors.  I provide such decompositions based on the models presented in Table 3 in 
this section.  










≅ ∆            ( 2 )  
where st denotes the welfare participation rate at time t and ∆ denotes a finite change.  Equation 
(2) says that the change in st due to a change in some factor z (such as the unemployment rate) is 
approximately equal to the derivative of st with respect to zt, multiplied by the change in zt.  The 
approximation is better, the smaller is the change in zt.
16 
  The welfare participation rate can be written in terms of welfare transition rates using the 
transition rule: 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 − − − + − = t t t t t s e s x s ,           ( 3 )  
where et denotes the entry rate and xt denotes the exit rate.  In words, equation (3) says that the 
welfare participation rate at period t is equal to the welfare participation rate at period t-1, less 
exits (1-xt), plus entries (from the proportion 1-st-1 of the population at risk of entry).  Because 
current participation depends on past participation as well as current transition rates, the 
                                                 
16  For this reason, I compute the decompositions as the sum of several wave-by-wave changes, rather than a single 
six-year change.   20  
participation rate exhibits inertia: current changes in entry and exit rates affect not just the 
current participation rate, but future participation rates as well. 
  To write entry and exit rates in terms of regression models presented in Table 3, I re-
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where  o
t e  is the entry rate from ongoing non-welfare spells at time t and  f
t e  is the entry rate 
from fresh non-welfare spells at time t.  Of the sample at risk of entry at time t, wt is the fraction 
at risk of entry from ongoing non-welfare spells, so 1-wt is the fraction at risk of entering from 
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  Substituting (4) and (5) into (3) and differentiating with respect to zt  yields: 
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where the term  o
z γ  denotes the coefficient on z in the model for ongoing welfare spells,  f
z γ  
denotes the coefficient on z in the model for fresh welfare spells, and  o
z β  and  f
z β  denote the   21  
corresponding coefficients from the models for ongoing and fresh non-welfare spells.  
Substituting (7) and (8) into (6) and the result into (2) provides a formula for decomposing the 
decline in the welfare participation rate into components attributable to the economy, welfare 
reform, and other factors.  In addition to providing an overall decomposition, equation (6) also 
provides a means for isolating the contribution of entry and exit to the overall change.  The first 
term in equation (6) (multiplied by ∆zt) provides the change in the welfare participation rate that 
is due to the effect of zt on welfare exits; the second term provides the change in the participation 
rate that is due to the effect of zt on welfare entries. 
  Table 5 presents decompositions for the period from 1993, when the welfare participation 
rate peaked, to 1999.  The top panel of the Table shows that the peak welfare participation rate 
was 7.9 percent.  By the end of 1999, it had fallen to 3 percent, a 62 percent decline. 
  Panel B decomposes this decline into components attributable to economic conditions 
and policy changes.  The first column presents changes in the participation rate.  The second 
presents these changes relative to the baseline 1993 participation rate, whereas the third column 
presents changes relative to the 1993-1999 decline.  Relative to the baseline, the change in the 
unemployment rate between 1993 and 1999 reduced the welfare participation rate by 3.1 percent, 
which amounts to 5 percent of the 1993-1999 decline in the participation rate.
17  Low-skill 
wages, which rose only about 5 percent over this period, account for a negligible fraction of the 
decline in welfare. 
  Likewise, welfare waivers account for little of the decline.  In contrast, TANF had 
sizeable effects on welfare participation.  TANF reduced welfare participation by 7.7 percent, 
                                                 
17  Klerman and Haider (2002) have argued that decompositions that start with the peak in welfare use may 
understate the effect of the economy, because the economy began to improve before the caseload began to fall.  
When I start the decomposition at the time that the unemployment rate peaks, the change in the unemployment rate 
accounts for about 9 percent of the caseload decline, with little change in the other results.   22  
relative to baseline, accounting for 12.4 percent of the 1993-1999 decline.  Welfare benefits had 
a small effect, accounting for just over 2 percent of the decline in the participation rate. 
  Like TANF, the EITC expansions had substantial effects on the welfare participation rate.  
They reduced welfare participation by 6.5 percent, relative to its 1993 peak.  Thus they 
accounted for over 10 percent of the 1993-1999 decline. 
  Columns (4) through (6) show the components of the change in the welfare participation 
rates that are due to changes in entry; columns (7) through (9) show the components that are due 
to changes in exit.  These figures show that the effects of the EITC and welfare benefits worked 
primarily through entries.  The effects of TANF worked mostly through exits, whereas the effect 
of the unemployment rate worked similarly through both. 
  In total, the six economic and policy factors accounted for in the decompositions combine 
to generate a roughly 20 to 25 percent decline in the welfare participation rate.  Put differently, 
they account for less than half of the decline that took place during the 1990s.  The remainder is 
explained by factors other than the falling unemployment rate and the changes in welfare and tax 
policy accounted for in the model.  These results make it clear that the decline in welfare 
participation was a very complex phenomenon.  Neither the longest economic expansion in post-
war history, nor the greatest change in social policy since the Great Depression, explains more 
than a fraction of the decline. 
  Before moving on, it is worth noting that these decompositions are similar to those in 
Grogger (2004, forthcoming).  There I estimated that welfare reform explained about 14 percent 
of the 1993-1999 decline in welfare participation, the EITC explained about 16 percent, and the 
unemployment rate explained about 10 percent.  The similarity of my earlier estimates to those 
presented here is striking because the earlier estimates were based on an analysis of welfare   23  
participation rates in the Current Population Survey.  Despite the use of different data sets and 
different analytical techniques, both analyses attribute similar portions of the caseload decline to 
changes in the economy and changes in policy.
18 
VI. Predicting the Effects of the Recent Economic Slowdown 
  The equations that underlie the decomposition analysis above can also be used to predict 
how welfare participation rates should respond to the recent downturn in the economy.  Between 
January 2000 and September 2002, the U.S. unemployment rate rose from 4.0 to 5.6 percent.  
Yet at the same time, the welfare caseload has actually fallen slightly, from an average of 2.27 
million families during 2000 to 2.02 million families in June 2002 (U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, 2002).  Predictions based on the models in Table 3 help explain why 
caseloads have remained roughly constant despite the increase in unemployment. 
  I use equation (3) above to generate two sets of out-of-sample predictions for the welfare 
participation rate.  The first is a counterfactual, which provides a prediction of how the 
participation rate would have evolved if the unemployment rate had remained at its January 2000 
value of 4.0 percent.  The result is displayed as the solid line in Figure 2.  It shows that there was 
a fair amount of inertia in the system as of the beginning of 2000.  Even if the unemployment 
rate had remained constant, the increase in exit rates and decrease in entry rates that took place 
                                                 
18  At the same time, my decomposition results differ markedly from those of Haider, Klerman, and Roth (2002).  
Based on California transition data, they conclude that the economy accounted for roughly half of the decline in that 
state's caseload.  Although differences in data and methods may explain part of the difference between their analysis 
and mine, there are many reasons to think that California should be different than the nation as a whole.  California's 
main pre-PRWORA welfare waiver increased earnings disregards and reduced the implicit tax rates on earnings, 
policy changes that should have actually increased its caseload, all else equal.  The state was the last to implement 
its TANF plan, in January 1998.  It has a relatively lenient sanction policy and adult-only time limits.  Compared to 
the rest of the nation, one would expect welfare reform to have played a relatively small role in reducing California's 
caseload.  Furthermore, the recession of the early 1990s cut deeper and lasted longer in California than in the nation 
as a whole.  Once it recovered, the state's economy grew more vigorously than elsewhere as well.  For all these 
reasons, one would expect the economy to explain more of the caseload decline in California than in the nation as a 
whole.   
   24  
during the latter part of the sample period (see Panels A and B of Figure 1) would have led to 
continued declines in the welfare participation rate. 
  To model how the increasing unemployment rate affected this trend, I first predict how it 
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using equations (7) and (8) to evaluate the derivatives.  These expressions yield a predicted entry 
and exit rate series for the period from November 1999 (the end of the sample period) to 
September 2002 (the most recent date for which unemployment data are available).  Because of 
the apparent inertia in the system, changes in the unemployment rate during this period may 
affect welfare participation rates well into the future.  To capture such effects, I assume that entry 
and exit rates remain constant at their September 2002 values through September 2004.  I then 
use the transition rule (equation (3)) to predict welfare participation rates based on these 
predicted transition rates. 
  The result is displayed as the dashed line in Figure 2.  Through 2000, the predicted 
participation rate is essentially the same as the counterfactual participation rate.  This is to be 
expected, since the unemployment rate hovered around 4 percent for most of that year.  Yet even 
the substantial increase in the unemployment rate that took place in 2001 (when it rose from 4.2   25  
percent in January to 5.8 percent in December) is predicted to have little effect on the welfare 
participation rate that year.  This is the result of the inertia in the system: changes in 
unemployment affect welfare transition rates contemporaneously, but those changes take time to 
affect the welfare participation rate.  This is the implication of the transition rule in equation (3), 
by which the participation rate is a function of past participation as well as current transition 
rates.  This inertia helps to explain why the caseload continued to decline slightly between 2001 
and mid-2002, even as the economy deteriorated substantially. 
  Another part of the explanation is that the unemployment rate has a fairly small effect on 
the participation rate.  The predicted participation rate for September 2003, after twelve months 
of assumed 5.6 percent unemployment, is 0.023.  The counterfactual prediction, based on the 
assumption that unemployment remained constant at 4.1 percent after November 1999, is 0.022.  
Although unemployment has statistically significant effects on transition rates, as shown in Table 
3, its quantitative effect on the participation rate is fairly small, as was suggested by the 
decomposition analysis in Table 5.  
VII. Conclusions 
  The results from this study are consistent with those from much of the prior literature on 
welfare reform.  Both the economy and reform played important roles in reducing the welfare 
caseload during the late 1990s.  The EITC had particularly strong effects. 
At the same time, decomposing welfare participation into entries and exits yields insights 
not forthcoming from studies of the welfare caseload.  It shows that much of the decline in 
welfare participation during the 1990s was driven by a reduction in welfare entries.  First-time 
entry, in turn, was affected by the improving state of the economy, the decline in real benefit 
levels, and the expansion of the EITC.     26  
Higher exit rates also drove the caseload decline.  Exit rates fell due to the decline in 
unemployment and the imposition of TANF.  TANF had a particularly important effect on long-
term welfare spells. 
The decomposition analysis indicated that TANF and the EITC played the most 
important roles in reducing welfare caseloads during the 1990s.  The economy also played a part, 
but its part was smaller.  The relatively modest effect of the economy, in conjunction with inertia 
in the caseload, helps explain why welfare receipt has remained roughly constant recently, 
despite considerable increases in unemployment. 
  The initial entry results raise a number of issues.  First, there is the question of whether 
TANF has reduced entries.  The estimated effects are large, but they are statistically 
insignificant.  The sizeable and significant EITC effects would be generally regarded as 
beneficial.  At the same time, they raise questions about the take-up of safety-net services.  If 
most families learn about such services when they first apply for welfare, then declines in initial 
entry rates due to expansions of the EITC may reduce knowledge and take-up of non-cash 
transfers.   
  More generally, the initial entry effects raise the question of how welfare reform has 
affected the behavior and well-being of families that would have signed up for welfare in the 
absence of recent policy changes.  Although numerous experiments provide information about 
the effects of welfare reform on families receiving aid, non-entrants are inherently more difficult 
to study than recipients.  Nevertheless, since roughly half the decline in the caseload was due to 
decreases in entry, the question merits serious attention.   27  
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Predicted Effects of the Economy on the Welfare Participation Rate 




Characteristics of Spells and Recipients 
A. Welfare spells  Ongoing Spells  Fresh Spells 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Duration as of month 1
2 61.7  65.3     
Median completed duration
1,2 160  204  12 28 
Right censored (%)  55.9    44.9   
4-month exit rate  0.070  0.255  0.189  0.392 
Age 31.45  8.21  29.61  8.99 
Married 0.098  0.297  0.155  0.362 
High school diploma  0.387  0.487  0.431  0.495 
No children  0.026  0.158  0.044  0.205 
Number of children  2.33  1.37  1.95  1.24 
Black 0.420  0.493  0.357  0.479 
Hispanic 0.223  0.416  0.215  0.411 
Number of spells  3,166  3,166  2,732  2,732 
Number of people  3,166  3,166  2,455  2,455 
B. Non-welfare spells  Ongoing Spells  Fresh Spells 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Duration as of month 1
3 216.4  141.7     
Median completed duration
4        
Right censored (%)  96.3    65.9   
4-month entry rate  0.006  0.074  0.114  0.317 
Age 34.53  11.90  32.04  8.92 
Married 0.562  0.496  0.289  0.453 
High school diploma   0.612  0.487  0.497  0.500 
No children  0.568  0.495  0.135  0.342 
Number of children  0.81  1.13  1.83  1.32 
Black 0.126  0.331  0.340  0.474 
Hispanic 0.126  0.331  0.182  0.386 
Number of spells  50,571  50,571  2,567  2,567 
Number of people  50,571  50,571  2,291  2,291 
1 Figures are medians and inter-quartile ranges. 
2 Durations are measured in months. 
3 Measured as months since age 15. 
4 The extent of right-censoring precludes estimation of median durations for non-
welfare spells.   34  
Table 2:  
The Economy, Welfare Reform, the EITC, and Welfare Benefits during the 1990s 
A. Unemployment and low-skill wages 



















































B. Number of states implementing state-wide waivers and TANF, by year of implementation 
Year  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  Total 
Any state-wide 
waiver 
0 0 3 4 4 8  10  0 0 0  29 
TANF  0 0 0 0 0 0  24  26  1 0  51 
C. Welfare benefits (1998$) 


























D. Key EITC Parameters 
1. Combined federal and state phase-in credit rate (%) 

















































2. Combined federal and state maximum credit (1998$) 

















































Note: Figures represent means and (standard deviations) of annual state-level data, except in Panel B.   35  
Table 3 
Entry and Exit Regressions 
     Exit     
Variable  Initial entry    Ongoing spells Fresh  spells    Re-entry 
 (1)    (2)  (3)    (4) 
Unemployment 0.107***    -0.152***  0.022    -0.014 
 (0.036)    (0.043)  (0.050)    (0.067) 
25th % Wages  -0.006***    0.003  0.002    -0.001 
 (0.002)    (0.002)  (0.003)    (0.004) 
Waiver -0.102    0.143  0.015    -0.091 
 (0.117)    (0.137)  (0.157)    (0.199) 
TANF Program  -0.303    0.475**  0.279    -0.409 
 (0.199)    (0.185)  (0.242)    (0.274) 
Maximum AFDC Benefit (÷100)  0.228**   -0.124  -0.029   0.078 
 (0.104)    (0.111)  (0.126)    (0.158) 
EITC Credit Rate  -0.032***    0.019  0.019    -0.040* 
 (0.011)    (0.013)  (0.015)    (0.020) 
Age
a     -0.007  -0.011**    -0.008 
     (0.005) (0.005)    (0.007) 
Child < 3 Years  0.770***    -0.153  -0.490***    0.203 
 (0.092)    (0.101)  (0.105)    (0.130) 
Child >=3 and <=5 YRS  0.338***    0.004  -0.235**    0.208 
 (0.099)    (0.094)  (0.109)    (0.130) 
Married -2.294***    0.840***  0.941***    -0.847*** 
  (0.075)  (0.101)  (0.099)   (0.117) 
High School Dropout  0.683***    -0.317***  -0.259***    0.424*** 
 (0.063)    (0.070)  (0.078)    (0.095) 
At Least Some College  -0.230    0.461***  0.139    0.154 
 (0.149)    (0.175)  (0.152)    (0.207) 
Black, Non-Hispanic  0.862***    -0.311***  -0.189**    0.118 
 (0.075)    (0.087)  (0.092)    (0.117) 
Hispanic 0.358***    -0.256***  -0.152    0.056 
 (0.091)    (0.099)  (0.114)    (0.140) 
No Children  -3.390***    2.091***  1.526***    -2.159*** 
 (0.252)    (0.302)  (0.407)    (0.512) 
2 Children  0.082    -0.231**  -0.060    0.280** 
 (0.079)    (0.095)  (0.102)    (0.129) 
3+ Children  0.651***    -0.506***  -0.123    0.136 
 (0.092)    (0.099)  (0.111)    (0.134) 
Repeat spell        -0.184**     
       (0.089)     
Num. of Observations  336,144   17,589  7,258   8,134 
Num. of Individuals  50,571    3,166  2,455    2,291 
Log Likelihood  -8571.7  -4037.0  -3180.0   -2523.2 
Duration Significant p>chi
2 0.000    0.000 0.000   0.000 
Years Significant p>chi
2 0.000    0.001  0.703   0.521 
States Significant p>chi
2 0.000   0.000  0.035   0.103   36  
 
Notes to Table 3 
 
a - Because age is collinear with the elapsed duration of initial non-welfare spells, it is entered as a series of dummies 
in the initial entry regression in order to provide a flexible baseline hazard. 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) account for presence of multiple observations per person In addition to the 
variables shown, all models include a constant, a dummy for other, non-Hispanic race/ethnicity, and (except for the 
initial entry regression) a set of elapsed duration dummies.  Asterisks indicate significance at 10 percent (*), 5 percent 
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Table 5 
Changes in Welfare Participation Attributable to the Economy, Welfare Reform, the EITC, and 
Other Factors:  
1993-1999 
              

















           
1993    0.079            
1999    0.030  -0.049 -0.620        
 
B. Changes in welfare participation explained by independent variables 
 
Change:    Total    Due to entry  Due to exit 

















































Attributable to  (1)  (2)  (3)   (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Unemployment 
rate 
  -0.0024 -0.031 0.050   -0.0011 -0.014  0.022   -0.0013 -0.017  0.027 
                    
25th%  Wages  -0.0003 -0.004 0.006   -0.0001 -0.001  0.002   -0.0002 -0.003  0.005 
                   
Waiver    -0.0006 -0.008 0.012   -0.0003 -0.004  0.006   -0.0003 -0.004  0.006 
                   
TANF  -0.0060 -0.077 0.124   -0.0024 -0.030  0.049   -0.0037 -0.047  0.076 
                   
Benefits  -0.0011 -0.014 0.022   -0.0007 -0.009  0.015   -0.0004 -0.005  0.008 
                   
EITC  -0.0051 -0.065 0.105   -0.0032 -0.040  0.065   -0.0020 -0.025  0.040 
                   
Total    -0.0155 -0.196 0.316   -0.0078 -0.099  0.159   -0.0079 -0.100  0.161 
Note: Totals may not add due to independent rounding. 
 